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In this paper, we develop and estimate a model of violence
between romantically linked men and women. Physical violence is
viewed as both a source of direct gratification and as an instrument
for controlling the victim's behavior. Our model is a Stackleberg
type model in which the assailant maximizes expected utility subject
to the stochastic reaction function of the victim. Our model is
estimated by a bounded—influence regression technique because the
process generating violence appears to lead to a heavy—tailed error
distribution.
Our empirical results suggest that increases in the assailants
(i.e. the male's) income serve to increase violence, while increases
in the proportion of the year that he is employed serve to decrease
violence. Further, the employment effect is larger than the income
effect. y way of contrast, our results suggest that the effect of
a change in the female's employment or income depends heavily on
her economic status relative to the male's. Finally,we find that
improvements in the female's opportunites outside the relationship
significantly reduce the level of violence.
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In the jast two decades economists have widenedtheir areas of
interest to such non—market activities as marriage,divorce, and
crime.' Following in this tradition, we have applied work on the
economics of the family and the economics of crime to anissue which
is currently receiving widespread national attention, namely,the
issue of domesticviolence.2'3
There is rather extensive evidence that violence within the
family is neither new nor uncommon. The mostcomprehensive and
nationally representative data available indicate that16 percent of
u.s. households (married or cohabitating couples)experienced
physical violence in the 12 months prior to the surveyand 28
percent experience violence at sometime during their relationship
(Strauss, GelleS and Steinmetz, 1980). In recognitionof the
breadth and scope of the problem the AttorneyGenerals Task Force
on Family Violence advises that we must admitthat family violence
is found at every level of our social structure(William L. Hart,
et al., 1984, iv).
In this paper we develop and estimate a modelof violence
between romantically—linked men and women.Physical violence is
viewed as both a source of direct gratification (e.g.,direct
enjoyment of the pain of another person orrelease of frustration)
and as an instrument for controlling the victimsbehavior. Our
model is a Stackelberg type model in which theassailant maximizes
expected utility subject to the stochastic reaction function of the
victim. Randomness is an essential featureof a model in which
1violence occurs for instrumental purposes. In a deterministic
model, the do: nant decision maker cm easily exploit the other
person's reaction function, and credible threats of violence can be
sufficient to control behavior. Our theoretical model differs from
dictatorial bargaining models of family decision making and from
classical principal—agent models in that the dominant partner does
not assure the other individual some minimum level of well—being.
In contrast to these models, the dominant partner in our model
accepts some probability that his or her decisions will result in
the other person (agent) leaving the relationship.
Our model is estimated by a bounded—influence regression
technique which limits the influence of small subsets of data on the
estimated parameters. We choose such a technique because the nature
of violence and early regression results both suggest a heavy—tailed
error distribution.
To briefly summarize our empirical results, we find that
increases in the assailant's (in our sample the male's) income serve
to increase violence, while increases in the proportion of the year
that he is employed serve to decrease the level of violence.
Further, the employment effect is larger than the income effect. If
the median male in our sample were to work one additional month and
earn his average monthly salary, the number of violent incidents
would fall significantly. By way of contrast, our re..ilts suggest
that the effect of a change in the female's employment or income
depends heavily on her economic status relative to the male's. For
example, if the male's income is low and the female's high, then
2further increases in the female's income serve to increase violence
significantly. Finally, we find that improvements in the female's
opportunities outside the relationship significantly reduce the
level of violence. This finding is quite interesting theoretically
since it supports the contention that opportunities outside te
family affect the distribution of resources within the family. If
external opportunities matter, bargaining models, such as the one
developed in this paper, are more relevant than more traditional
neo—classical models of family decision—making such as those
developed by Becker.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section,
we briefly survey the relevant theoretical and empirical
literatures, and in Section III we develop our model of domestic
violence. We next, in Section IV, describe our data and present our
empirical model. Section V contains our empirical results and the
final section our conclusions.
II. The Literature
The existing literature on domestic violence is primarily
descriptive with few attempts to model family situations that lead
to violence4. In their summary of the National Conference for
Family Violence Research, Finkelbor, et al. indicate a need to link
the study of forms of family violence and abuse to more
well—established research literatures and the need for systematiC
theory building and testings (Firiklehor, et al., 1983, p. 12). The
work undertaken in this paper is in part a response to these
suggestions.
3when developing our model we draw heavily on the economic
literatures that model criminal activity and family decirion
making. Both of these literatures have been heavily influenced by
Becker's pioneering work (Becker, 1968., 1973, 1974). In his 1968
article on crime Becker posits that an individual comlnits an
offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could
get by using his time and other resources in other activities
(Becker, 1968, p. 176). Since 1968, Becker's model of crime has
been extended and tested empirically. However, economic models of
crime have by and large remained models of purely individual
behavior.5 Only for crimes against persons, such as murder, is
the interaction between individuals considered. Even in these
cases, the model is often structured as an individual optimization
problem. For example, in Ehrlich's model of murder the interaction
between the murderer and the victim is handled by having the
victim's well—being enter the murderer's utility function (Ehrlich,
1975). The problem then reduces to one with a single individual,
the murderer, as the decision maker.
By way of contrast, the family decision making literature has
as its focus relationships between individuals. Models of family
decision making are of two basic types: (1) models such as those
developed by Sainuelson (1956) and Becker (1973, 1974) that posit a
single Utility function for the family, and (2) bargaining models
which use game theoretic approaches.6
4Bargaining models of family decision making have been developed
quite recently (see Manser and Brown, 1980 and McElroy and Homey,
1981). In these models the best opportunity for each individual
outside the re1ations:ip establishes a minimum acceptable position
within the relationship. Unlike models such as Becker's that posit
one family utility function, the bargaining models assume that the
family members have conflicting preferences and postulate an
explicit bargaining structure to resolve conflicts. In bargaining
models that, treat the individuals in the relationship symmetrically,
the outcome of the process is generally a Nash or a
Kalai—SmorOdiflskY equilibrium. The alternative dictatorial
bargaining models identify one individual as the dominant partner
and impose a Stackelberg equilibrium; the dominant partnermaximizes
his or her utility subject to a constraint that the more submissive
partner receives the minimally acceptable utilitylevel for which
the person will remain in the relationship.
The usual dictatorial bargaining model is in some respects
appropriate for representing the behavior in violent relationships.
As a bargaining model, it allows the male and female tohave
differing objectives as would seem likely in such relationships.
The nonsymnietric treatment of family members in thedictatorial
model is consistent with empirical evidence indicating that the male
tends to be the dominant partner and the aggressor whenviolence
7,8 occurs.
Our reading of the family violence and sociology literatures
suggests, however, that even the usual dictatorial bargainingmodel
Sdoes not adequately capture all the essential aspects of violent
relationships. Violent relationships, even more than other
relationships, tend to beunstable.9 In terms of a dictatorial
bargaining model, this means that the dominant person does not
necessarily assure the other person the minimum utility level
required for the individual to stay.
An additional complication in considering family violence and
in relating it to other models of criminal activity is that the
crime may not be an end in and of itself. The violence may also be
a means of exercising control over the victim's behavior. In terms
of the general literature on violence, the violence is both
expressive and instrumental. Expressive violence provides an
assailant with direct gratification; the gratification may result
simply from pleasure in inflicting harm, or it may be the result of
some indirect psychic improvement such as would occur if an
individual relieved pent—up frustrations by striking out. By way of
contrast, instrumental violence is used as a method of obtaining
some other desired end, for example, forcing the victim to behave as
desired by the assailant. The existing literature strongly
indicates that domestic violence occurs for both instrumental and
expressive reasons, and we seek to incorporate both motivations in
our model.
III. The Theoretical Model
Consistent with the existing evidence, we assume that the male,
the dominant partner and assailant in the relationship, has
6expressive and instrumental motives for inflicting violence.To
incorporate expressive violence we allow the level of violence to
enter the male's utility function directly. Incorporating
instrumental violence in the model is more difficult. We see the
male as attempting to impose certain types of behavior on his
partner. He does this by setting rules of behavior for his partner
and credibly threatening violence if these rules are not obeyed.
These rules might cover a number of aspects of behavior including
the use of financial funds, contact with friends and other family
members, and the provision of services within the home or ñirectiy
to the male.
The male makes his choices in order to maximize his expected
utility. To focus on violent aspects of the relationship we assume
that his utility, if the relationship remains intact, depends only
upon the level of services provided by his partner(z), the level of
violence he inflicts on his partner (v), and the level of sanctions
against him as a result of his violent behavior(Cm). His utility
is an increasing function of the level of services and a decreasing
function of the sanctions. His utility may be an increasing or a
decreasing (eventually) function of the violence. The male
determines rules of behavior for his partner and the violence level
that will result if his rules are disobeyed. In its simplest form,
the rules may be expressed as a minimum level of the services that
he requires, ,andthe violence he will inflict if she disobeys,
and if she obeys, v°. The rule—setting is affected by his
expectations concerning his partner's and external agents'reactions
to his decisions and the resulting violence.
7Modeling the male's expectations concerning his partner's
reactions to his rules and the violence requires some care and leads
to an interesting discovery. in models where the male knows the
female's reaction with certainty [i.e., knows for any rule (z,
v°) whether the female will obey, disobey, or leave], no
instrumental violence will be observed. in such models, the male
sets the rules in such a way that it is never optimal for the female
to disobey. She will either stay in the relationship and obey the
rules or she will leave.10 See Tauchen, Long and Witte (1983).
In order to allow for instrumental violence, we assume that the
male's expectation of the female's utility has a random component.
The random element may result from the inability of any one
individual to know the preferences and alternatives of another, or
from truly random elements in the female's behavior. We assume that
the male has a perceived joint probability density function, g, for
a random variable in the female's utility function if she remairs in
the relationship ()and for her utility in the bestalternative
outside the relationship (it).Themale does not know the
realized values of the random variables when he makes the rules; the
female knows the value when she chooses whether to obey, disobey, or
leave.
It is somewhat simpler to model the uncertainty arising from
intervention by external agents as a result of the male's violence.
Existing evidence indicates that external intervention often takes
non—monetary forms such as the disapproval of friends. Toreflect
this, we see the costs of external intervention as entering the
8male's and the female's utility functions directly. Although the
male is the culprit, external intervention may impose costs on the
female as a result of exposing the violent nature of the family or
as a result of direct court cost and legal fees paid from family
income. Eoth the expected probability of external intervention (71)
and the costs to the male (Cm) and to the female() are
increasing functions of the level of violence.
In the remaind€r of this section we describe: (1) the female's
choice problem in order to show how the probabilities of
disobedience, obedience, and leaving are affected by his rules; (2)
the male's choice problem in terms of setting the rules; and (3) the
properties of the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium. The female's
Utility if she remains in the relationship is:
f f
U (z, v, c ,c
where denotes the female's utility function andis the value
of the random variable in her preferences (at least as perceived by
the male). Her utility is an eventually decreasing function of the
level of services and a decreasing functior of violence and the
random variable •Tosimplify our work we assume that the
marginal utility of violence is a decreasing function of the random
variable
Given her partner's rules, the female's choices are to disobey,
obey, or leave. If she disobeys, the female incurs violence,
and chooses the level of services to maxrnize her expected utility,
where her uncertainty results fom the possibility of external
intervention. Her expected utility if she disobeys, is:
9f,d dd d f ddf d
EU (z ,V,) • ii(V )U (z ,V,c(V ),C)+
(1—ri(vd))Uf(z,vd, 0, c ) (1)
where d denotes the optimal level of services if she disobeys.
The female's second possible choice is to obey. The level of
ser ices must be at least ,andin the interesting case the
required level of the services acts as a binding constraint on her
behavior. Her expected utility if she obeys is defined analogously
to (1) above.
The female's third potential choice is to leave, in which case
the woman's best alternative yields her utility level Forany
realized values of the random variables, and thewoman
compares the maximum utility levels if she obeys, disobeys, or
leaves and makes the choice that gives her the highest expected
utility.
As noted earlier, the male, like the female, seeks to maximize
expected utility. However, the males problem is more complicated
than the female's as he has to estimate the probability that the
female will make each of her potential choices. He estimates these
probabilities from his perceived joint probability density function
on the random variables, g. Formally, the male seeks to:
Max Hum pdEUm,d + POEUTh,O + plum
,vd,v0
where ELI
,dand EU'° denote the male's expected utility if the
female disobeys and obeys, ?isthe male's level of utility in
do 1
his best alternative to the relationship, and P ,P,andP
denote the male's expectation concerning the probability that the
female disobeys, obeys and leaves the relationship, respectively.
10The male's expected utilities are defined analogous to the
female's. The male's expectation that the female will disobey is:
—— ddd
c (z, v', V) EU, (z,v,
=f .1. g(c,U)dcd
where is the value of r for which the female is indifferent
between disobeying and obeying given the required level of services
and the threatened violence levels. His expectations ofp0 and
are defined analogously.
Given the above model, we can determine the first order
conditions for n optimum.(See Tauchen, Long, and Witte, 1983,
for this derivation.) Even with rather strong assumptions on the
form of the utility functions (e.g., additive separability) and on
the probability density function, the signs for the comparative
static results are ambiguous. For example, consider the effects of
an improvement in the woman's opportunities outside the relationship
(e.g., greater support from public or private agencies). Such an
improvement has two distinct and opposing effects on the threatened
level of violence, even in the simplest case where violence is used
only for instrumental purposes. First, when the woman has better
opportunities, violence becomes a less effective means ofobtaining
obedience. Threatening violence is less likely to induce her to
obey rather than disobey, and the optimal level of threatened
violence falls. Second, with an improvement in her opportunities,
the probability that she stays, ceteris paribus, is lower. Thus the
probability that the relationship remains intact and that the male
inflicts violence and bears the costs associated with violence are
11less. With a lower probability of bearing the cost, the optimal
level of threatened violence rises. The relative magnitude of these
two effects is ambiguous, and thus the effect of an improvement in
her opportunities on the level of violence is an empirical question.
IV. The npirical Model and Data
The theoretical model presented in the previous section has two
important implications for empirical work. First, the model
suggests three jointly determined, reduced form equations: one each
for the level of rule setting, disobedience, and violence. There is
no identified structural system in which any of these endogenous
variables appear as right hand side variables. Second, the model
implies that all exogenous factors in the model enter all
11
equations. The exogenous variables in the model are of four
basic types:(1) variables reflecting the characteristics of the
relationship (e.g., number of children, family income); (2)
variables reflecting the male's and female's situation if the
relationship were dissolved (e.g., whether the couple is married,
number of young children); (3) variables reflecting the tastes and
prefer-nces of the male and female (e.g., racial/ethnic group, age);
and (4) variables affecting the probability and cost of external
intervention as a result of the violence.
The data used in the empirical analysis are from interviews
with 125 women who had been physically abused by their male,
romantic partners. The interviews were conducted in 1982 and 1983
with women recruited in Santa Barbara County, California. Most of
12the women (60 percent) were identifiei by personnel oflocal
shelters for battered women or a special victim/witness assistance
program in the county district attorneys office.The remainder
were recruited through personal contacts of interviewers,
counselorS, lawyers, Catholic service agencies, classes, or using
snowball sampling techniques. Care was taken to achieve accurate
results by conducting the interviews face—to—face soon afterthe
women were identified and by paying a nominal amount ($25).
While this data set is not idea for studying domestic violence,
it represents one of the most extensive and complete data sets
currently available for studying this sensitive and important
topic. We believe that results we obtain using these data provide
interesting insights concerning our model, but generalizationsmust
await more representative data sets.
Table 1 contains a list of the endogeflous and exogenous
variables used in our empirical work and descriptive statistics for
the variables. The measure of violence is the number ofviolent
incidents that the women reported to have occurred in the 6 months
prior to the interview. The measure of male rule settingis the
number of areas in which the female reported that the male setrules
with which she disagrees.12 The measure of diobedience is the
number of areas in which the male sets rules and the femaleboth
disagrees and disobeys.
The exogenous variables are divided into an economic and a
noneconomic category in Tale 1. The economic category includesthe
males and feniales income and employment. AFDC payments are not
13attributed either to the male or female. Under California's AFDC—U
program the male may receive payment while the family s intact;
however, the female is more likely to receive the payments if the
family were- to dissolve.
Careful consideration of our measure of male employment led us
to delete 14 aged and disabled men from our data set. We did this
to allow unambiguous interpretation of a value of zero for the male
employment variable as indicating uneinloyment of an able—bodied male.
The noneconomic category include sociodemographic variables
(e.g., age and race), variables which measure the characteristics of
the relationship and costs of ending it (e.g., the number of
children, marital status), and variables reflecting the
opportunities available to the male and female if the relationship
were ended (e.g., the number of children less than six and the
availability of alternative living arrangements for the female).
The coefficients on the racial/ethnic variables must be
interpreted with care as they may well incorporate indirect as well
as direct effe:ts on violence. The indirect effects result from the
potential relationship between the male's and female's racial/ethnic
group and the probability of arrest for an incident of domestic
violence in Santa Barbara County. We discovered this indirect
effect while working with a Santa Barbara data set collected in
1978. This data set had information on whether or not an arrest
occurred as a result of an incident of domestic violence. Using
these data, we estimated a model for the probability ofarrest.13
Most variables sign.ficantly related to the probability of arrest
14related to the nature of the violent incident. These variables are
endogenous to our model of violence and, thus, should not enter the
reduced form equations that we estimate. However, our results also
indicated that black males and males with minority female partners
are significantly more likely to be arrested than are other males.
Racial/ethnic variables are clearly exogenous to the model and,
thus, should enter the reduced forms not only because different
racial/ethnic groups my have different proclivities for violence
(the direct effect), but also because it appears that they face
different probabilities of arrest (an indirect effect).
V.npirical Results
We began by examining OLS and Tobit results for the violence
equation with all the variables listed in the second part of Table1
appearing in linear form. The Tobit technique was considered
because the endogenous variable, the number of violent incidents
during the six month period, is censored at zero. In our sample,
the number of violent incidents ranges from zero (14 percent of the
sample) to 180 (daily beatings for 2 percent of the sample). The
correct specification of a model with a censored dependent variable
depends on the extent of censoring and the conditional distribution
of the non—censored observations. Recent Monte Carlo results
suggest that when it is reasonable to assume a truncated normal
distribution for non—censored observations, OLS and Tobit analyses
produce virtually identical results when the concentration at the
14
censoring point does not exceed 20 to 25 percent of the sample.
15Comparing the estimated OLS and Tobit parameters for our model
confirms this result. To our concern, however, both techniques
yield a number of abnormally large Studentized residuals. There are
several possible explanations: (1) data errors, (2) misspecifica—
tion of the model due to omitted variables or incorrect functional
form, and (3) incorrect distributional assumptions.
We checked for data errors using techniques developed by
Beisley, Kuh and Welsch (1980). Given the extensive hand and
computer cleanin of the data, it was surprising to us to find six
observations where anrwers to questions were inconsistent. We were
able to correct two of these errors by going back to the coding
forms and were forced to delete four other inconsistent observations
from our sample.
To examine the specification of the model we checked various
plots of the residuals but found no patterns suggestive of omitted
variables. Nor did careful consideration of the characteristics of
the outlying observations suggest any additional independent
variables. We did note, however, that for most of the outlying data
points the frequency of violence was high (> 20 incidents in a six
month period). As a final check for omitted variables we altered
the measures of some independent variables and added other variables
to our specification. The coefficients on the new variables were
either insignificant or less significant than the alternative
measure in our previous specification.5
16To explore the possibility that we had used anincorrect
functional form, we added quadratic and interaction terms for all
economic variables. The new specification for the economic
variables can, of course, oe considered a second order approximation
to any non—linear form. Given our sample size it was :ot possible
to consider second order approximations for the non—economic
variables.
in all specifications considered, normal probability plotsof
the Studentized residuals reveal an upper tail that isthicker than
can be accounted for by a normal distribution. Webelieve that the
process generating the large residuals isthe potentially
uncontrollable nature of violence once it has reached a high level.
We estimate our model using a bounded influence regression
technique (BIR) developed by .rasker and Welsch (1982). This
technique limits the bias in results due to departurefrom normality)
or other misspecificatiofl, while minimizing the asymptoticvariance
of the normal model subject to a bound on the asymptotic grosserror
sensitivity. An advantage of the BIR method is that it can beused
when, as in our case, the gross error distribution maybe
assymetric. We selected this robust estimation method after
considering a number of other possibilities. See Tauchen,Witte and
Long (1984) for a discussion.
Table 2 contains both OLS and BIR results. The large
differences between the least squares and BIR results are
immediately evident. For some variables the coefficient estimates
differ by a factor of ten. The message is clear: OLS,and by
17extension, Tobit parameter estimates contain substantial bias and,
thus, these techniques are inappropriate for our model. Further,
use of the SIR technique rather than OLS markedly improves the
"fit of our model. An improvement in fit is to be expected when
anomalous observations are downweighted as they are in BIR, but even
so the increase in the F—statistic andR2 is.rather striking.
Since the economic varables enter our model in a non—linear
form, it was necessary to use Wald tests to determine the
significance of these variables. We find that all of the economic
variables except the proportion of the time that the female is
employed are significantly related to the number of violent
incidents at the .001 level; the female's employment is
significantly related to the number of violent incidents at the .01
level. With many of the second order terms in the economic
variables being significant, the effects of changes in the economic
variables depend on the level of income and employment and cannot
easily be described by examining only the indivdual coefficients.
Accordingly, we computed the elasticities for effects of changes in
the economic variables for values of income and employment
representative of our sample.
Our results suggest that the frequency of violence depends on
both income level and source. At median values or all independent
variables, an increase in the male's weekly income is associated
with a significant increase in the violence, ceteris paribus
(t—ratio 3.52). The elasticity of the number of violent
incidents with respect to the male's income is 1.12 at the
18median. Thus for individuals representative of our sample,
increased income may actually serve to increase violence. Indeed,
for couples in which the males income is at or below the median, we
find that an increase in his income is assoiaed with a positive or
zero effect on violence regardless of the victim's income and either
partner's employment. Further, for non—working men, increases in
income (i.e.? increases in unearned and non—AFDC income) always
serve to increase violence. Only for high income males are
increases in income ever associated with less violence.
We find that the level of violence decreases significantly as
the fraction of time the male is employed increases at median and
most other values representative of our sample. Indeed, when
significant, the effect of increased employment for the male is
always negative, and is stronger the higher is the couples income.
Further, increases in male employment have far stronger effects on
violence than do increases in male income (an elasticity of —3.74
and 1.12, respectively). If a male representative of our sample
works one additional month and earns his average monthly salary, the
number of violent incidents falls significantly. The negative
employment effect on violence more ti-an offsets the positive income
effect.
This strong employment effect contrasts sharply with the vast
majority of work on the relationship between crime and
employment.16 Our work in this study suggests that the weak
results in the literature may stem from: (1) inadequate measures of
income, (2) use of a 1/0 (employed vs. unemployed) measure rather
19than a continuous measure for employment, or (3) use of too simple a
ntional form.
The effects of changes in the female's income and employment do
not parallel the effects of such changes for the male. Forvalues
of the independent variables at the median for our sample, neither
changes in the female's employment nor changes in herincome have a
significant effect on violence. changes in the female's income
significantly affect violence only when the income level ofthe male
and female differ markedly. For example, if the male's income is
low (at or below the median), then further increases in thefemale's
income serve to increase violence significantly. in contrast, if
the male's income is high and the female's low, then increasesin
her income may serve to lower significantly the frequency of
violence.
Changes in the female's employment significantly affect
violence for only two types of families:(1) high income families
and (2) low income working families. in very high income families,
an increase in the time the woman spends working isassociated with
a significant increase in the frequency of violence. In low income
worki'g families, an increase in employment (and accompanying
changes in her income) serve to lower violence. One possible
interpretation of our finding is that increases in female employment
mayonlyhave beneficial effects if the need for income is pressing.
A comparison of the effects of changes in employmentfor the
male and female provides some insights concerning the reason for the
strong employment effect for ma.es. Increases in employmenthave a
number of potential effects on violence: (1) income effects,
20(2) psychological effects, (3) physical effects,and (4) time
effects. As we are contrclliflg for income, we know that the effect
of employment we observe is not an income effect. Our quite
different results for the effects of employment for the male and
female also suggest that the major cause of the strong effectof
male employment does not arise mainly from the reduced time together
for employed couples (i.e., the time at risk' factor). We areleft
with the conclusion tl-t increases in male employment serve to
decrease violence primarily because of beneficial psychological
effects (e.g., increased self—esteem) or because of physical effects
(e.g., increased fatigue).
Approximately 30 percent of the families in our samplereceive
AFDC payments. For these families increasesin AFDC payments, or in
the victim's income from any other sources, serve to lower the
number of violent incidents. Other results described previouslyfor
nOn—AFDC families tend to be even stronger for AFDC families.The
one difference in results involves the victim's employment.FO
AFDC families, increases in the female's employment are morelikely
to be associated with higher violence.
Since the noneconomic variables enter the model linearly our
results for these variables are more easily summarized. interms of
the male's and female's ages (AGEM and AGEF), we find that older men
beat more frequently, holding other variables includingthe woman's
age constant, and that younger women are beaten moreoften. Like
men who earn less than their partners, menwho are older than their
partner tend to inflict more violence. Note also thatthe
coefficient on MARRIED is insignificant. Our results provide no
21support for the claim that the marriage license is a hitting
license.
As mentioned previously, the level of violence is less (3.3
incidents less per six months) if the woman has family, friends, or
an affordable motel where she can stay (STAY) when she feels
threatened by her partner. This finding is consistent with our
theoretical model and our choice of empirical technique. In terms
of the theoretical model, it does appear that the male offers the
female a better domestic situation when she has an immediately
available housing alternative. Also, with a means of escape from
the potentially violent situation, the woman is able to avoid the
threatened outbursts against her. The immediately available escape
seems to provide more real protection for the female involved in a
violent romantic relationship than the longer term security and
independence that a higher income level might seem to offer. The
policy implication would seem to be that providing short-term
shelters for victims of domestic assaults may be more effective in
lowering the frequency of the violence than general income
assistance payments.
Our results for the children variables clearly show a
relationship between family characteristics and violence.
Specifically, our results suggest that the relationship will,
ceteris paribus, be more violent if the couple has patented more
children together. At first glance this result miht be interpreted
as supporting the common hypothesis that a 'trapped victim with
other responsibilities is more ready to tolerate violence. Note,
however, the coefficient on the variable for the number of her and
22their young children (CHIL.D>6). With more young children in the
family setting, there is less violence. Generally, this result
together with the finding that higher income women may suffer more
rather than less violence, contradicts the common notion that
violence is more prevalent when the woman has fewer financial
resources of her own and more financial responsibilities. Not
unsurprisingly, the presence of children from other relationships
(STEPCHLD) is associated with more violence.
As shown by the coefficients on the racial/ethnic variables, we
find no difference in the frequency of violence across racial/ethnic
groups. Whatever differences there may be in the characteristics of
the groups in regard to domestic violence may be exactly balanced by
differences in the perceived probability of criminal justice system
actions across the groups. Recall from the previous section that
black males and males married to minority females are more likely to
be arrested for domestic violence, other things equal. Thus, it may
be that the insignificant coefficients on the racial binaries are a
result of offsetting direct effects (e.g., differences in behaviors
and attitudes) and indirect effects (i.e., differences in the
perceived probability of arrest).
We also estimate models of rule—setting and disobedience. We
use a maximum likelihood ordered logit procedure since the dependent
variable consists of a series of ordered categories. Having
discovered anomalous residuals for our violence equation we checked
for but found no similar pattern in the rule setting and
disobedience equations. This lends considerable support to the
23contention that the anomalous residuals in the violence equation are
due to the non—normality of the distribution of the endogenous
variable since other specification and response errors should appear
in or rule setting and disobedience equations as well as our
violence equation.
The rule—setting and disobedience models explain much less of
the variance in the data than does t,e violence model.
Specifically,, the likelihood ratio statistic for our model of
rule—;ettiflg is OfliY significant at the .40 level; the comparable
statistic for our model of disobedience is .14.
In the rule—setting equation the only economic variable that is
significantly related to the extent of the male's rule—setting rt
the .05 level or better is the portion of time the male works. An
increase in the fraction of time the male is employed tends to
decrease the extent of his rule—setting, other things equal. This
result seems to support our finding for the violence equation where
the male was also found to be less physically abusive as the
proportion of time spent working increases. The number of the
couple's own children is the only other variable that is significant
at the .05 level or better. The male tends to set more rules if the
couple has parented more children together.
Non—economic rather than employment and income variables are
significantly related to the female's disobedience. A woman is more
likely to disobey her partner's rules if the couple has had more
children, particularly if the children are still young. Further,
Hispanic and younger men are less likely to be disobeyed, other
things equal. Note that Hispanic men are not perceived to set
24significantly more or less rules, but the rules theydo set are less
likely to be disobeyed.
VI. Conclusions
We believe that our theoretical ant empirical work offer
interesting and valuable insights. For example, since opportunities
outside the relationship significantly affect the level of violence,
it appears that a bargaining model, such as ours, more closely
represents decision 7naking for violent couples than do traditional
neoclassical models. Also, our findings suggest that violence may
be a resource that the male uses to maintain control when
disadvantaged or challenged in other ways (e.g., relativelylower in
economic status or older than the female). There is a literature
which views individuals as using physical as well as otherresources
to maintain control in relationships (e.g., Scanzoni, l979)
however, we know of no work incorporating this effectfor violent
relationships.
Prom a purely theoretical perspective, we believe that our
model provides an interesting extension of principal—agentand other
bargaining models of relationships. in contrast to existing
dictatorial bargaining models and principal—agent models, wedo not,
in our model, impose the assumption that the dominant partner
provides the ot!.er individual with the minimumutility level
necessary to perpetuatethe relationship. Rather, we see one
partner as uncertain as to the other'sbehavior and opportunities.
This partner, in making his or her decisions, accepts some
25probability that the relationship will be terminated. We believe
that this approach provides an interesting alternative to current
models that allow relationships to be terminated (e.g., models of
divorce).
26FOOTNOTES
'Becker has been a dominant force in economic analyses in
many non—market areas. For examples seeBecker and Landes (1974)
and Becker (1981). Although work in non—market areas has been
dominated by Becker and the Chicago school, it has not beenlimited
to Chicago. For examples of work by individuals not directly
associated with the Chicago school see Heineke (1978), Manger and
Brown (1980), McElroy and Homey (1981) Pollak (1983), and Schmidt
and Witte (1984). Even work outside the Chicago school has,
however, been greatly influenced by the Chicago approach.
2As far as we are aware There has only been one previous
attempt by economists to analyze domestic violence ——Long, Witte
and Karr (1983).
3Nationai concern about domestic violence has been apparent
in the popularpress.However, it •was not until 1983 when Attorney
General William French Smith established a Task Force on Family
Violence charged with identifying the scope of the problem of
family violence in America and of making suitable recommendations
(William L. Hart, et al., 1984, vi—vii) that the issue received the
concentrated attention of the federal government.
4For historical and legal perspectives on domestic violence,
see Davidson (1978), Dobash and Dobash (1979), andMartin (1976).
For surveys of the family violence literature see Gelles (1980,
1982) and Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz (1980).
5For surveys of the theoretical literature see Heineke (1978)
or Schmidt and Witte (1984). For surveys of the empirical
literature see Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin (1978) or Cook (1980).
6See Pollak (1984) for a survey of models of family decision
making.
7$ee Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz (1980) and Yllo (1983) for
evidence concerning dominance in violent relationships.
8See Berk and Sherman (1983), Novack and Galaway (1982), and
U.S. Department of Justice (1980) for evidence'that suggests that
the male is the assailant in 93 to 95 percent of the incidents of
domestic violence.
9See Levinger (1966) and Pagelow (1981) for evidence.
10This property of the nonstochastic model is analogous to
the well—know property of principal—agent models when theagent's
effort can be observed accurately. In the case of the
principal—agent model, the fee is structured so that the agent
receives a very low reward unless the optimal effort isforthcoming. In the- nonstochastic family violence model, the male
threatens a high level of violence and low utility for the female,
if she disobeys. As in the principal—agent models, the constraint
upon the !ale's rule—setting is that the female (agent) may leave
the relationship if the rules are too strict. The optimal structure
for the rules is such that purely •instrumental violence for
disobedience of the rules is never observed.
11This may seem odd at first glance, but it is the nature of
bargaining models that the characteristics of each participant may
affect all decisions.
felt that male rules with which the female agrees were
non--binding and, thus, irrelevant for the purpose of testing our
mocl.
'3See Tauchen, Witte and Long (1984) for details of the
analysis of the probabiUty of arrest.
14rhese Monte C-rlo experiments were conducted by Donald
Waidman of the Univerity of Colorado and David Guilkey of the
University of North Carolina. Details can be obtained from Donald
Waldman.
l5In particular, variables measuring the length of the
relationship and reporting stresses had coefficients that were
insignificantly different from zero.
'6See Long and Witte (1981) or Freeman (1983) for surveys.P IBLIOGRAPHY
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Symbols, Definition, Mean Values and Standard Deviations
of Empirical Variables
Standard
Symbol Definition Mean Deviation
(N=125)
Endogenous Variables:
VIOL The number of violent incidents
in the six months prior to
incident that led to the
interview 10.56 28.67
RULES The number of aresa in which
the male has strong ides
on a particular topic and the
female disagrees 4•70b 2•74b
DISOBED The number of areas8 in which
the male has strong ideas
and the female both disagrees
and disobeys 119b 127b
Exogenous Variables:
Economic:
INCM Male's weekly income from
all sources except AFDC $231.81 $211.20
INCF Female's weekly income from
all sources except AFDC $127.14 $128.27
WORKM The fraction of the year that
the male was employed 0.69 0.38
WORKF The fraction of the year that
the female was employed 0.56 0.42
AFDCC Family'sweekly receipt of AFDC
payments 327.78$ 49.67Table 1
(continued)
Standard
Symbol Definition Mean Deviation
(N=125)
Non—Economic:
AGEM The male's age in years 30.61 7.02
AGEF The females age in years 27.68 6.71
CHILDTG The number of children from the
relationship 0.92 1.06
CHILD<6 The number of her and their
children who are less than six
years old 0.78 0.85
STEPCHILD The number of his or her
children living with her 0.38 0.79
HISPANM A binary variable equal to
one if the male is Hispanic
and zero otherwise 0.33 0.47
BLACKM A binary variable equal to
one if the male is black
or other non—Eispanic minorityd
and zero otherwise 0.14 0.35
MNRTYF Abinaryvariable equal to one
if the female is minoritye and
zero therwise 0.26 0.45
MARRIED A binary variable equal to one
if the male and female have ever
been married and zero otherwise 0.72 0.45
STAY A binary variable equal to one
if the victim had a place to
stay if she left the relat ion—
ship and zero otherwise 0.73 0.45Notes to Table 1
aThere are twelve areas in which we discerned the males rule-setting
behavior and the female's reaction to the rules set. The areas are: working
outside the home, having a bank account, having credit cards, handling
household finances, giving her money to the male, taking responsibility for
household work and child care, seeing her women friends, seeing her relatives,
talking on the phone, calling or seeing the male during the day, and sexual
relations.
bThe sample size used when calculating thesenumbers was 99, not 125,
due to missing values in these variables.
CWe did not attrbute APDC payments to either the male or female since
California has an AFDc—U program and, thus, payment often went to the family
unit. There was very little income other than AFDC that was received jointly
by the victim and assailant.
dThe racial/ethnic group denoted BLACKM includes black, Indian, Asian,
and other males.
eThe racial/ethnic group denoted MNRTYF includes Hispanic, black,
Indian, Asian, and other females. There were too few minority females to
allow us to create two binaries as we did for the males.Table 2
Results of the Analyses of the Nzmber of Violent Incidents
(t—ratios in parentheses)
(Nl25)




































































Test for significance of model 1.48 14•73a
(significance level) (>.078) (>.001)
R2 0.32 082b
*Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from
zero at the .10 level, two tailed test.
**Indicates that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the .05 level, two tailed test.
***Indjcates that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the .01 level, two tailed test.
aThS statistic is based on the Wald test and is distributed
F30194 under the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all
independent variables are jointly equal to zero.Table 2
(continued)
bThjs R2 figure was calculated by notingthat in OLS the
likelihood ratio test statisticused t test the joint significance
of the explanatory variables
is:
=(N—p/p—i)(R2/l_R2)
where p is the number of parameters
estimated and N is sample size.
The F_statistic that weobtain for our bounded influenceregression
would imply anR2 of .82.